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ABSTRACT 
 
The computer IC is the heart of the information and telecommunication technology. It is a tiny 
artifact, but with incredible organizing powers. We use this physical artifact as the location for 
studying central problems of the knowledge economy.  
First, the paper describes the history of chip design and the emergence of the technological 
community involved in designing and manufacturing computer chips. The community is 
structured in a way that reflects the underlying physical nature silicon and the numerous other 
materials and chemicals involved. But it also reflects the human agency of defining new projects, 
of visioning the liberation from atoms, of committing to travel many detours in the labyrinths of 
development, and of perceiving and exploring the affordance that new technologies hide.  
Some of these characteristics are analyzed empirically in a case study of designing a chip for a 
digitalized hearing instrument. It is found that technological progress is not hindered, but rather 
aided by the use of imperfect principles, abstractions and representations of reality. The power of 
such imperfections is discussed and generalized.  
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To see the World in a Grain of Sand, 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the Palm of Your Hand,  
And Eternity in an Hour”   
(William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, quoted from 
Bateson, 2000) 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE DIGITALIZATION OF SOCIETY 
This paper attempts to see the world of information technology and product development in the 
tiny, technical artifact, the Integrated Circuit (IC) – for convenience also referred to as chips. 
Chips are the heart of the all the numerous computers in modern society. The paper is an account 
of the complexities of modern technology, but also a theory about the ways in which aggregate 
complexity is produced by the systematic application of very simple principles of distinction and 
organization; and about the ways in which the functionality and performativity at the aggregate 
level depend on the ingenious management of the integrity of these simple principles.  
We start with a very brief account of the history of IC design and the building of the vast 
community of diverse actors involved in designing and manufacturing of ICs. Next, we analyze a 
specific case of product development, which revolves around the design of a specialized chip. 
From this case we deduce some patterns of behavior and management that apparently led to 
success in the specific case, and which may explain the success in general of the computerization 
and digitalization of organizations and society. The successes are less surprising than the 
principles and behavioral patterns that we describe. This leads to speculations on how to 
conceptualize the managerial and organizational challenges in connection with the development 
of new technology and the design of new chips.  
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The interest in a material artifact, in the present case the chip, may seem a little old-fashioned. It 
is the current understanding that physical artifacts become less and less important, while 
symbolic artifacts become more and more important. Expressed in a more fashionable 
terminology, we move from atoms to bits, 
"World trade has traditionally consisted of exchanging atoms. ... [W]e were shipping 
a large, heavy, and inert mass, slowly, painfully, and expensively, across thousands 
of miles, over a period of many days. When you go through customs you declare your 
atoms, not your bits. ... This is changing rapidly. The methodical movement of 
recorded music as pieces of plastic, like the slow human handling of most 
information in the form of books, magazines, newspapers, and videocassettes, is 
about to become the instantaneous and inexpensive transfer of electronic data that 
move at the speed of light. In this form, the information can become universally 
accessible. ... The change from atoms to bits is irrevocable and unstoppable" (p.4) 
(Negroponte, 1995) 
True it is that digitalization is ubiquitous. More and more things are put into digital form for use 
and transportation by computers. The following illustration indicates the possibilities and 
promises of exchanging bits for atoms:  
In 2002 the Danish Government allocated a large sum of money to the digitalization 
of the Danish cultural heritage!1  The political ambition is to make this cultural 
heritage accessible to the public at large from a home computer.  
                                                 
1 http://www.kum.dk/sw5379.asp. Press release from Ministry of Culture, 9 Januar 2003. 
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It saves the Danes a good bit of traveling, in space and time, when they want to get into contact 
with their cultural roots. In the terminology of e.g. Deleuze and Latour, all these distant histories 
and achievements are folded into a technical devise that enables people to collect information, to 
explore their imaginations, and to develop new appreciations and insights (Latour, 2002). Long 
ago our forefathers toiled with heavy stones to properly bury one of their kings, leaving the 
dolmen in the farmers’ way today. Without much toil we can now bring these stones and stories 
home – in virtual form. Exotic history and cultivated citizens – just a few keystrokes away! 
While we will not be concerned with the question whether such promises of the digitalization are 
actually kept, it may be worthwhile to explicate an assumption about the relationship between 
bits and atoms. In the words of Latour, technology is half instrumentation, half “affordance” 
(Gibson, 1986; Latour, 2002) – it issues permissions and promises which are grasped and 
enacted, and which eventually lead to new ends and new functions, some undoubtedly more 
valuable and significant than others. Technology cannot have worth as bits without some atoms 
somewhere. It is the combination of atoms and bits that should concern and fascinate us. We may 
be more interested in the affordance and the bits, but these interests are folded into material 
artifacts. When Latour equips people with a hammer, their “projects” change because of “… the 
flux of possibilities that they are suddenly able to envisage” (Latour, 2002). The atoms generate 
the bits and their relevance by fostering new visions and goals. When we become equipped with 
computers and digitalized cultural heritage, we possibly may develop an urge to visit our cultural 
roots, even their material form at the museum – and undoubtedly to digitize even more things. 
Preferences and projects emerge endogenously, closely related to the perception of the promises 
and permissions that the new technology holds (Cyert & March, 1992; March & Simon, 1993; 
March, 1999).  
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True it is, however, that we often can allow ourselves to forget about the atoms – to pretend that 
only bits are important. However, to do so without negative consequences depends on material 
artifacts – on the atoms being successfully disciplined. This is what chip design is all about, 
disciplining the “atoms” in a way that make them allies in whatever project we set out to 
accomplish. 
Thus, there is nothing paradoxical in studying the nature of the information society and the 
knowledge economy in the arrangement of atoms in chips. The perspective we adopt in 
analyzing the chip design and production highlights the heterogeneous temporalities, spaces and 
actors hidden in the physical artifact and ready to be unfolded. In Latour’s words, “There is 
nothing less local, less contemporary, less brutal than a hammer, as soon as one begins to unfold 
what it sets in motion...” (Latour, 2002): p. 249). What is true of hammers is certainly true of 
ICs. They are narrow issues when looked upon as final tools and dead physical objects. They are 
entries to a past and current history when we treat them as a vantage point from which we can 
appreciate the multiple processes, interests, compromises and serendipity that go into making 
and exploiting them.  
Thus, we will try to get to the “big picture” of organizing and managing efforts in the knowledge 
economy by unfolding this tiny material artifact – searching the artifact for traces and marks of 
these efforts and aspirations. And we will start from the very beginning by consulting Boolean 
logic and the physical nature of silicon. 
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THE ARTIFACT, THE COMPUTER IC 
In most accounts, Claude Shannon (1916-2001) is the central figure in the invention of the 
modern computer. In the 1930’s he worked on Vannevar Bush’s mechanical computing device, 
the Differential Analyser. This device was cumbersome to work with because every change of 
input involved a reconfiguration of all the mechanical gears etc. Having been trained in Boolean 
algebra as an undergraduate, he somehow came to think of the parallel between telephone switch 
circuits and symbolic logics. He made the translation from “on” and “off” to “true” and “false” – 
and eventually provided the mathematical foundation for the engineering of circuitry lay out. 
Information was relieved of any content and meaning – semantics is simply not relevant to the 
engineering problem, which was about expressing information in quantitative form. Complex 
messages consist of strictly logical aggregation of on-or-off bits (the acronym of Binary Digits) 
that conventionally are bundled into Bytes (8-bits combinations). Letters and signs are 
represented by bytes, words by combinations of bytes, sentences by combinations of 
combinations of bytes, and so on and so forth. 
The history of the development of the IC is a repeated celebration of such simplicity. It is from 
the extension of the same basic principles that the complexity and nuances at the aggregate level 
emerge. No matter how complex computers and their applications become, the foundation is still 
the Boolean logic that allows “everything” to be represented by bits and bytes. Possibly all you 
need to understand is three types of logical gates. Inspired combinations of such logical gates 
will eventually capture everything under the Sun.  
Around the same time as Shannon made his contribution to the logical foundation of the IC, 
W.H. Brattain accidentally discovered that silicon becomes a conductor when water condenses 
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on it. In its pure form, silicon is an insulator. As it turned out, it was the “pollution” with water 
that changed its conducting character. The next many years of development was focused on 
making the pollution “effective” and the conductivity controllable. That involved, on the one 
hand, making the silicon purer and, on the other hand, implanting impurity in the form of ions of 
e.g. arsenic and gallium that allowed the current to pass on certain controllable conditions – to 
turn on or off the electricity. Eventually, the transistor, i.e. the physical embodiment of the 
logical gate mentioned above, was developed.  
With the advancement of production technology, it is today possible to produce transistors 
reliably and inexpensively. The packing of thousands of transistors on a piece of silicon, 
patterned according to a logical circuitry layout, embodies the modern IC. Its complexity is 
awesome, yet: 
The fundamental principles are surprisingly simple. The miracle is the constant 
refinement of those principles to the point where, today, tens of millions of 
transistors can be inexpensively formed onto a single IC. 2  
E.g. the INTEL Pentium 4 holds no less than 42 million transistors. Even so, it is the same basic 
principles of the transistors and the same three fundamental types of gates that still are producing 
such technical progress.  
In summary, the complexities of modern computers have a very simple and common foundation: 
• It is based on a very simple logic, one that distinguishes between true and false conditions 
(Boolean logic). 
                                                 
2 www.electronics.howstuffworks.com/diode.htm p. 5. 
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• The logic is translated into silicon, one of the most common elements on the Earth – the 
main element in e.g. sand.  
• The vast increase in efficiency and applicability is a result of a systematic extension of 
the same principles – more transistors, finer masks, purer silicon, etc.   
Like a standard-sized brick can produce wonderfully diverse patterns and complex buildings 
with a bit of architectural ingenuity and craftsmanship, so can a logical principle and its 
implementation in the form of transistors seemingly lead to an infinite number of highly complex 
and advanced applications.  
THE IC COMMUNITY 
Now we turn to the technological community that designs and produces the IC to specific 
applications. The abovementioned principle of simplicity behind the complexity of the artifact 
we recognize again for the organization of the value chain. It consists of a bewildering number of 
points of specialization, but each point in the chain is a fairly simple action net (Czarniawska, 
2002; Czarniawska, 1997).  
E.g., in the one end of the value chain we find companies specializing in the crystal pulling to 
produce the purest forms of silicon – and we have other companies specializing in producing the 
machines pulling the crystals. Further down the value chain we have companies specializing in 
producing various chemicals which will enhance the insulation. And we have the big 
manufacturing fabs (with the well-known brand names) which translate the circuit design into 
silicon and encapsulate them.  
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The mentioned points of specialization are just a few examples of the literally hundreds of 
points, each with further networks of specialized suppliers of materials, tools, and machinery. 
Most of the structural building blocks are rather small action nets. As an extreme example, we 
found a point of specialization in the manufacturing of machines that apply the welding substrate 
when the IC is attached to the circuit board. Two suppliers of such machines alone share 80-90% 
of the world market.  
The picture that emerges is again one of aggregate complexity. Each building block is fairly 
manageable in terms of number of competitors, product variants, technological agendas etc. 
However, when such building blocks combine in thousands, we face a perplexing structural 
proliferation, an extreme degree of specialization and a monumental division of labor. It is not 
difficult to understand what drives this process of proliferation. Take the above-mentioned 
machines for applying welding substrate as an example. The number of legs and contacts that 
connect the IC to the circuit board has risen rapidly over the years, while at the same time the IC 
size has shrunk. Some years back welding substrate was applied manually, but since growing 
ambitions in the design of ICs also generated a need for incredible precision in this tiny step – a 
degree of precision that could not be met by humans – the development of “welding substrate 
application” tools and machines became a matter of necessity for exploiting the technical 
advances in practice.  
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Simple Principles of Coordination and Organization 
A huge number of actors and technical disciplines collaborate in designing and producing the IC 
and in increasing its efficiency and performativity at a rapid pace.3 All knowledge domains and 
participants seem perfectly aligned, making one suspect that an elaborate social structure must be 
in place to coordinate the multitude of activities. However, it appears that the system is more like 
a spontaneous order (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1992) – or as Weick would have it, a collective that 
behaves as if it was organized and coordinated centrally (Weick & Roberts, 2001). How is it 
possible to achieve high levels of coordination spontaneously.  
The main explanation is division of knowledge. According to Hayek (1948), civilization thrives 
on such a division of knowledge (Kirzner, 1992). Each action net relates to other action nets on a 
basis of familiarity, not knowledge. Division of knowledge is one of the most celebrated features 
of modern civilization because it allows us all to concentrate on adding knowledge to 
knowledge, i.e. building our own knowledge on top of the knowledge of everybody else – which, 
according to (Drucker, 1993) is the only, or at least the most important value creating operation. 
We know what our computer can do – and under which conditions it will do it. It really doesn’t 
matter that we are at a complete loss when asked to explain why and how it works. In a similar 
manner (except perhaps at a somewhat higher level of understanding) the various actors may 
engage in dedicated development work within their local action net. If they can improve the 
performativity in one or the other direction, others will see it as a permission to add their own 
                                                 
3 Even within this spontaneous order, the rate of innovation is enormous. The best indication is Moore’s law that 
states that an IC’s number of transistors will double every 18 months. The law is still valid according to empirical 
evidence!  
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knowledge and ingenuity in exploiting the new opportunity. Thus, for example, the development 
of new lithography techniques that allow vastly reduced photo masks and the etching of many 
more transistors on the IC can take place at a local point in the value chain without coordination 
with everybody else. When the new technique has been developed, other action nets may 
perceive new possibilities to be explored and exploited. However, even if the affordance of the 
new lithography technique is not perceived and exploited in the short run, this does not threaten 
the alignment and coordination of the actors in the value chain. Thus, the relationships in the 
knowledge economy are more dominated by affordance than by dependencies, and the need for 
coordination (beyond what is already built into the structure of the value chain) is minimal.  
This raises the question how we may understand the structure of the value chain. Having already 
characterized it as a spontaneous order, we are not searching for somebody who designed the 
value chain. We are searching for evolutionary principles that produced the current structure as 
an outcome. One such principle is the sequential application of technical ingenuity. 
Technological development can be pictures as an exploration of a labyrinth, with the repeated 
encounter of impasses.  
Ingenuity begins with Daedalus, prince of the labyrinth, that is, with the unexpected 
branching-out which at first distances us from the goal. (Frontisi-Ducroux, 1975). 
When we say there is a technical problem to resolve, we precisely wish to introduce 
the addressee to the detour, to the labyrinth that he will have to confront before 
pursuing his initial objectives. (Latour, 2002) 
Detours, technical problems, or as Ciborra (2002) calls it, “reverse salients” hinder progress, but 
also stimulate effort, ingenuity and creativity. When such efforts are successful new knowledge 
emerges, new possibilities for specialization arise, and new divisions of knowledge and structural 
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proliferation are occasioned. Each innovation creates a challenge for other, often neighboring 
action nets. Before the lithographic innovation can be exploited new insulating chemicals and 
new machines for connecting transistors may need to be invented. Such impasses may slow 
down progress, but will also greatly direct and motivate the ingenuity of other members of the IC 
community. The mobilization of new types of knowledge, and the structural alignment of new 
types of experts, is the result of repeatedly encountering impasses, obstacles, and technical 
problems. Each exploration of the labyrinth will produce new impasses, obstacles, and problems.  
The ways in which such impasses, obstacles, and problems are determined and defined in the 
course of technological development will be analyzed in details in a case study of hearing 
instruments. In sum, we see the value chain of the chip as a perfect illustration of the knowledge 
economy. The division of knowledge is astonishing; the structure has arisen gradually, as a 
proliferation of points of specialization, in response to the encounter of technical impasses at 
each and every turn in the labyrinth. Each successful victory over a technical obstacle has opened 
new venues for progress and new innovations. Thus, the community is structured in a way that 
reflects the underlying physical nature silicon and the numerous other materials and chemicals 
involved. It also reflects the human agency of defining new projects, of visioning the liberation 
from atoms, of committing to travel many detours in the labyrinth of development, and of 
perceiving and exploring the affordance that every new impasse potentially hides.  
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COMPUTERIZED HEARING INSTRUMENTS: A CASE STORY4
1995 was the year when hearing instruments turned into a computer. It took four 
years of concentrated development work and more than ten years of audiological 
research to achieve this. (Oticon Annual Report 1995 – our translation)  
This was the jubilant announcement of major technological breakthrough by the Danish 
manufacturer, Oticon, who had hitherto been famous mainly for its exotic ‘spaghetti 
organization’ (Peters, 1992). The new hearing instrument with a ‘digital audio processor’ was 
named DigiFocus.  
DigiFocus was meant to improve the quality of life for the hearing impaired population. The 
needs of this population were construed in ways that translated into three specific requirements 
that the new hearing instrument aimed to fulfill:  
? Miniaturization – to satisfy aesthetic demands  
? High fidelity sound reproduction – to satisfy the functional demands in often chaotically 
changing sound and noise environments. Since hearing impairment is highly idiosyncratic, 
this requirement included a need for adapting the instrument to the individual user. 
? Usability – to satisfy the need for forgetting the instrument (and the hearing impairment) in 
daily life, including avoiding a too often recharging of batteries and an automatic adjustment 
of volume etc.  
                                                 
4 Our account is based primarily on publicly available material, e.g. annual reports and (Pedersen. The Genesis of a 
Digital Hearing Instrument. Hearing Instruments [March], 38-39. 1996.). In connection with another study (authors) we 
interviewed a number of people inside and outside Oticon who were involved in the DigiFocus project. The logical 
structure of the problem presentation is documented in this material, but the data collection does not allow us to claim 
detailed insights into the particular processes, the intentions of the actors, and the historical contingencies that impinged 
upon the development process.  
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Figure 1: The Design Space for Hearing Instruments 
The exploration of this design space, which ultimately materialized in the form of the DigiFocus, 
was in many ways unpredictable and indirect. The project team continued to hit upon technical 
problems that needed to be solved before further progress could be made. On one occasion, one 
that will be the focal theme of this case account, the project got sidetracked to a quite foreign 
place. 
Some researchers have likened the process of technology development to moving around in a 
labyrinth (Latour, 2002). At each turn, new obstacles appear that block the direct way to the goal. 
Solving the problems requires you to take a detour that initially distances you further from the 
goal, but which eventually allows you to make progress.  
We will describe the labyrinth in some detail. We will also describe the competencies and 
strategies that enabled Oticon, with ingenuity and luck, to find its way in the labyrinth towards 
the goal.  
The Technical Obstacles of Hearing Instrument Design 
To put a small computer into a hearing instrument was the overarching concept of DigiFocus. 
The heart of a computer is a chip. The high performance of the chip was critical for achieving Hi 
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Fi sound reproduction. Computer chips operate on electricity. In the case of hearing instruments, 
batteries were (and so far are) the only available source of electricity.  
Increasing the quality of the sound reproduction could be translated into an increasing number of 
operations that the chip needed to perform. E.g. traditionally, compression is done in three 
frequency bands, but DigiFocus was conceived to compress in seven bands. The more operations 
required of the chip, the higher its power consumption. Everything else being equal, the increase 
in sound reproduction quality could be translated into a need for higher battery capacity.  
However, the capacity of the batteries is positively correlated to their size. Simply adding 
capacity by increasing battery size was not an option in view of the miniaturization constraint. 
Simply reducing capacity by increasing the frequency of recharging batteries was not an option 
in view of the usability constraint. An adequately small battery, with a correspondingly small 
capacity, was not an option because of the Hi Fi sound reproduction constraint. The only logical 
way out of this design impasse was to invent a chip with lower energy consumption.  
Lowering the energy consumption of a chip can be achieved by lowering its voltage. At the time, 
the standard voltage in all modern electronic equipment was 5 volt, but DigiFocus became 
envisioned to be equipped with a 1-volt chip, which would reduce the power consumption to 
1/25! Oticon had never done it before, and existing design tools and libraries were of little use 
for the chip designers in arriving at a functional design. Work had to be done at the transistor 
level all along, which made the design job very complex. At the time of taking this turn in the 
labyrinth it was not at all certain whether such a detour would lead to success, i.e. that such a 
functional design could be made within the time parameters of the project. This became the more 
uncertain when further obstacles were encountered. 
 
Kristian Kreiner  18 
While reducing the power consumption, reducing the voltage has also less fortunate implications. 
First of all, it reduces the speed of the chip, which translates directly into a loss in performance. 
The strategy of lowering the chip’s voltage might prove self-defeating unless the chip designers 
were able to increase the efficiency of the chip itself. Many new design features were invented 
and built into the chip, e.g. in the form of new ways of parallel processing. However, 
immediately the choice of a 1-volt chip simply redefined the problem from one of providing 
sufficient battery power to one of increasing the efficiency of the chip, i.e. to perform more 
functions within a given capacity.  
The choice of a lower voltage solution had other implications. With a 1-volt chip the whole 
spectrum of sound (in terms of frequencies) has to be represented on a vastly reduced scale. This 
would require a level of precision that was unattainable with the envisioned chip. Thus, the 
development of DigiFocus arrived at a new impasse. Saving energy by lowering the voltage of 
the chip not only slowed it down; in the context of hearing instruments it also added new and 
unattainable processing requirements. It seemed that this strategy led from one impasse to 
another even worse impasse.  
Logically, the need for precision would be relaxed if not all frequencies needed to be represented 
on the 1-volt scale, i.e. if some frequencies could be skipped. The implied logic is heretic, 
however, because according to commonsense that would also reduce the quality in sound 
reproduction. Nonetheless, the question was framed in this way to escape the impasse: can some 
frequencies be skipped without the human ear noticing a loss of sound reproduction quality – and 
if so, which frequencies could be skipped?  
This turn in the labyrinth was dramatic in a different way than the previous ones had been. It 
shipped the problem out of the hands of Oticon’s own experts in chip design and electro 
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acoustics, and into the hands of experts in psychoacoustics. Perceived sound quality is highly 
subjective, and psychoacoustics conducts experiments on human beings to collect data on their 
perceptions. Thus, the problem was transported not only to a foreign university where the 
experiments were conducted over several years; it was also transported to a foreign knowledge 
domain – foreign in terms of both expertise and methodology.  
Eventually, the psychoacoustics experts provided the IC designers with the algorithms and 
specifications they needed to reduce the replication of frequencies. With this break-through of 
the hitherto technical impasse, their chip design proved feasible and the DigiFocus became a 
functional hearing instrument and an immediate commercial success.  
*** 
This is far from the whole story, and importantly, it is our story: our reconstruction of the logic 
behind the impasses encountered along the way – and the logic behind the detours of developing 
a hearing instrument. It cannot be claimed that these logical steps correspond to the episodic 
events in the empirical process. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed to correspond to the 
experience and current memory of the involved experts. In is quite possible, even likely, that our 
imputation of an underlying logic in the detours was experienced as annoying obstacles and 
unnecessary delays. Thus, we make no secret of the fact that this account is a logical 
reconstruction – and clearly a simplification of the actual empirical process. We cannot claim 
more than that the impasses described were real (whether or not they were attended to as such), 
and that the exploration of the labyrinth might have happened as we described it.  
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Case Analysis: The Construction of the Labyrinth 
The critical step in our logical reconstruction of the development process of DigiFocus is the 
development of the algorithm for skipping frequencies – and by the same token, the inclusion of 
psycho-acoustical experts. They were mobilized on the paradoxical idea that frequencies could 
be eliminated without a loss in reproduction quality. The chip designers were mobilized on the 
equally paradoxical idea that the number of operations could be increased with a slower chip. 
Both were successful in finding a solution to the problem. Had they been unsuccessful, our 
specific reconstruction of the case would have been changed, but the logic would have remained 
the same. The logic is one of defining labyrinths and shifting around impasses for various experts 
to circumvent. The process could be conceptualized as one of finding new ways of presenting 
problems, rather than straightforward searches for solutions. As such, the problem could be seen 
to have the character of an “insight problem” (Simon, 1999).  
New ways of presenting a problem seems to have much organizing power, but in a different 
manner than most theories assume. Most theories about new product development focus on a 
project team with shared structural capital, a common understanding of the mission and problem, 
a high degree of coordination and an architectural design that is frozen from the outset. Our 
picture is different. Little communication and mutual understanding were required for the two 
domains to establish order.5 Simple ideas stated in an ordinary language that even we, as lay 
                                                 
5 There is no doubt that considerably more social interaction and communication took place across the domains of 
knowledge. Some of this communication had no doubt the function of creating mutual trust and respect. We do not 
propose to cut out such forms of communication. In the present context, however, our aim is to understand how little 
communication is required for transmitting the knowledge from one domain to the other. 
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readers, understand, and awaiting an answer in a less simple, yet operational language formed 
the point of tangency. And while we cannot accept that the quantitative form of information (the 
algorithm) was without content and meaning, we can safely claim that it had highly different and 
local content and meaning. The algorithm acquired the character of a boundary object. A 
boundary object has an identity, but it means quite different things to different communities. 
Visually, it is exactly the point of tangency between communities or knowledge domains. The 
same thing (the algorithm) meant less instructions and higher speed to IC designers, less power 
consumption to the electrical engineers, and a whole new paradigm for studying the human ear 
and the perception of sound to the psycho-acoustics experts. To the sales people it meant a 
highly convincing argument (even scientifically accountable) for introducing a revolutionary 
first-mover product in a very profitable segment of the market; to the production people it meant 
new alliances with highly specialized IC fabs. The organizing potency of a boundary object is the 
number of contexts in which it is enacted and rendered meaningful. The idea of less accuracy in 
reproducing hi-fi quality was fuzzy, yet meaningful. It gave the psychoacoustics experts the 
license to work on a new and enlarging set of problems. When they returned with a ‘solution’ in 
the form of the algorithm, this solution was immediately useful to the chip designers. The chip 
designers did not need to understand the first thing about psychoacoustics.6 They were not 
dependent on the intentions and premises that these foreign experts worked on. They might as 
well have read the algorithms in a book, had this book existed, which it did not, of course. They 
imagined that such a book could be written and found somebody to write it for them.  
                                                 
6 In fact, they probably did know quite a lot. Also, they probably communicated more with the psychoacoustics 
experts in Sweden that we have described here. But the chip designers’ ability to add knowledge to the knowledge 
of the psychoacoustics experts would seem not to hinge on such communication and insights.  
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Likewise, the psychoacoustics experts did not need to know anything about chip design, power-
consumption and the aesthetic demands of customers. They were handed a problem that made 
immediate sense within their specialized and isolated knowledge domain. They responded to the 
problem not because of an appreciation of its significance to others, but because of an 
appreciation of its significance to their own domain. They produced a solution in a form that did 
not reflect the needs of the chip designers, but that reflected their own new way of knowing. It 
was “readable” for the chip designers, not because the psycho-acoustical experts tried to 
communicate their insights, but because the solution was packaged in an algorithm that could be 
implemented as a black-box.  
It is important to remember that there was nothing inevitable about the psycho-acoustics experts’ 
discovery of an algorithm; nor was there anything inevitable about the chip designers’ 
formulation of the impasse in terms of a reduction of the number for frequencies reproduced. It 
was necessarily a tentative formulation of an insight problem. History could have turned out 
quite differently. Clearly, they could have discarded the feasibility of a 1-volt chip from the 
beginning, in which case they might never have involved the psycho-acoustical experts – at least 
not in the central role in which they actually ended up. In hindsight we know that the strategy 
was feasible and productive, but there is no guarantee that feasible and productive strategies are 
perceived and adopted. The labyrinth could have been conceived differently, charging other 
experts with the task of devising the break-through.  
Summary  
The success of the OTICON was manifest. We can safely ascribe this success to the ingenuity of 
the involved designers and experts. However, had the same strategy not resulted in a feasible 
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hearing instrument it would probably have been said to be naïve or wrong. In fact, for a very 
long time the successful outcome was in serious doubt. Furthermore, we have no way of 
knowing if a different strategy would have produced an even more productive result.  
Thus, we cannot claim that the same strategy would lead to similar break-through results, were it 
repeated a second time. And if the same strategy led to fiasco, we could not claim that the 
strategy was wrong. Many factors will contribute to the eventual outcome, good or bad. We 
cannot possibly control for all these factors – nor can the experts and managers in practice. There 
is nothing deterministic about technology and product development.  
Yet, the strategy which we will characterize shortly, proved to be a feasible one. It provided a 
context, a labyrinth, which gave new perspectives on inherent affordances and which led to many 
types of local exploration. If management was involved, it was involved in arranging the context 
in such a way that impasses were considered challenging and worthwhile. Management, and the 
chip designers, had little competence for giving advice to the psycho-acoustical experts on how 
to solve the puzzle. They created the context, defined the challenge, provided the incentives, and 
awaited the experts to perceive the challenge and pursue the ideas. Thus, the management of 
technology is half instrumentation, half affordance! It fosters ingenuity as much as it practices it. 
It motivates as much as it directs. It depends on the outcome of the process as much as the 
outcome depends on it. It legitimizes exploration and possibly futility, as much as it requests 
exploitation and efficiency. It poses paradoxical questions as much as it aims at clearly 
translatable answers. It depends much on the ingenious enactment of what might easily be 
portrayed as paradoxical and uninformed requests.  
According to most standards, such management would seem highly imperfect. It would seem to 
relinquish all managerial control – to accept the fate control of (in this case) some distant 
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psycho-acoustical experts. We think we know from the case study that on this occasion it 
actually worked. But perhaps the most serious erosion of control is the inability to evaluate 
outcomes and to learn from experience in the knowledge economy characterized by an elaborate 
division of knowledge. That issue we will discuss in the next section.  
THE EROSION OF CONTROL 
Adding knowledge to knowledge implies that the knowledge of others is black-boxed and used 
as tools in our own projects. It gives us immense power, as when the chip designers could 
implement the algorithm of many years of psycho-acoustical experimentation. And at the same 
time, the possibility for exploiting the power of the tools implies a concurrent erosion of control, 
the control of being able to evaluate the solutions and services that are provided by the tool or the 
other experts. In the case described above, we have a clear appreciation of the functional 
adequacy of the algorithm. However, we (and the chip designers) have no way of knowing 
whether the algorithm might be much stricter, allowing an even higher performance of the 
hearing instrument.  
The set of issues find a parallel in the discussion of the use of design tools for chip design. In 
another study of ASIC design [author] we interviewed designers about the experience of having 
a mediated access to reality by using design tools.  
There is a tendency to satisfy the design tools. In most cases ASIC designers can 
hardly be said to be taking maximum advantage of the potential for high speed and 
low power consumption in the processor that is actually used in a specific 
application…  
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Designers become isolated from the reality on the other side of the tool. [The tool] 
says: Sure, you can specify whatever you want in the whole wide world. Then I – the 
design tool – will build it for you. [But] You may get 100 gates [a proxy for the 
number of transistors – authors’ comments] instead of 16 for a given problem if the 
design tool is allowed to decide. 
The general story behind the seductive design tool is that it both permits and restricts. You can 
book your own plane tickets, design your own living room, select the right school for your 
children, or find a restaurant with a good hygienic reputation. In our case, you can ask distant 
experts about the feasibility of skipping frequencies without loss of perceived sound quality. 
However, the ability to operate in the knowledge economy is not match by an ability to critically 
evaluate the result. You may feel vindicated by the outcomes, and feel certain of your own 
ability or luck. You may appreciate the school you chose, without ever being able to check 
whether other schools might have proven even better for your child.  
The lesson from surrendering authority to the design tool or algorithms is not a clear-cut one. We 
may recognize the inherent risk of operating at a level of familiarity. The Drucker argument of 
value production by adding knowledge to knowledge faces its limits. Applying own knowledge 
to the knowledge of others, with which one is familiar, but not knowledgeable, should be 
celebrated as the hallmark of the division of knowledge in our modern civilization. It is the great 
accomplishment of the knowledge economy that it allows so much focus and attention to be 
devoted to people’s own projects and explorations – the knowledge of all the others making such 
a focus possible and attractive. We can do more and more things, and we can aspire to do even 
more things. But we can critically assess and appreciate the outcomes less and less. There is an 
inherent risk of becoming used to, even being seduced to like bad solutions. We may not realize 
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these costs, since our satisfaction is governed not by critical scrutiny, but by aspirations and/or 
common standards. Bad solutions are of course bad if they do not function at all. But they are 
still sorts of solutions as long as they function at some minimal level of efficiency. Solutions that 
are bad constitute type 2 problems (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1992) and the costs are opportunity 
costs.  
THE PERFORMATIVITY OF IMPERFECTIONS 
It might be tempting to claim that bad ideas, as discussed above, rest on wrong or ambiguous 
ideas. But the example of chip design and manufacturing suggests that this is certainly not the 
case. Most of the development as we have described it is based on visions and abstractions that 
are clearly inaccurate or simply wrong. The most immediate example is the claim that we can 
model the physical reality of silicon on the model of Boolean logic. The model is elegant and 
elaborate but it is notoriously a poor representation of the physical reality. Consider the 
following observation by a chip designer,  
The claim that we deal with a digital reality is not true. Of course, the physical 
reality is one of currents [of electrons] at different levels of intensity, higher or 
lower. But we have created an abstraction that says: we only need to distinguish 
between two states – one that we call ‘off’ and one that we call ‘on’. This is an 
incredibly powerful abstraction. So instead of thinking in terms of continuous levels 
of currents when building a computer – a world so complex that you would never be 
able to build anything – we’ve got this abstraction that allows you to assume that the 
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current is either off or on. But the physical reality is not like that. Designers tend to 
forget this, and that can produce mistakes when the design is translated into silicon.7  
A proxy, an abstraction that simplifies and translates all Nature’s intricacies into two distinct 
states, is recognized as “incredibly powerful”. It has enabled the community to design vastly 
complex chips and computers. However, at some point in the technological development, 
another truth will emerge. Nature is not digital; it is analogue, and much more difficult to model 
and designing analogue.   
We need to understand the power of a simplified and inaccurate rendering of the physical reality, 
which we want to control and exploit. At some point, the simplicity and controllability will meet 
with the complexities and paradoxes of real life situations, just as the Boolean logic will meet the 
heedless electrons. Design at the sub-micron level threatens to bring us in a situation where we 
cannot determine whether the gate is open or closed. Thus, the success of the IC design lies in 
avoiding such situations.  
The abstraction introduced by Shannon’s logic was translated into a physical material, into 
silicon. It presumed a character of physical nature that was helpful, but incorrect. More and more 
labyrinths will have to be traveled to circumvent this problem, as ambitions for more and more 
transistors continue to grow. So far, other inventions have allowed the designers not to relax their 
ambitions to honor Moore’s law. The problems have been defined, and the labyrinth has been 
designed ,in such a way that new inventions have extended the zone of validity of the 
abstraction.  
                                                 
7 Quoted from [authors]. 
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It seems from the case, however, that the abstraction and simplification is not the problem, but 
the solution. The solution to increase the quality of the sound reproduction was a less perfect 
reproduction, not a more perfect reproduction. The quality of the outcome did not depend on the 
number of frequencies alone. It depended on the total constitution of the hearing instrument. A 
reduction of the number of frequencies allowed the chip designers and the electro engineers to 
accomplish things that vastly compensated for the imperfection of the frequencies reproduced. 
Furthermore, the human ear was demonstrated not to be able to perceive the increased 
inaccurateness. It doesn’t matter if inputs (in terms of principles, models and abstractions) are 
correct. The pragmatic, and decisive criterion for assessing the quality relates not to the input, 
but to the outputs. If the inaccurateness can be controlled in terms of the effects on the outputs, a 
relaxation on the accuracy and perfection of inputs may provide the impetus to an exploration of 
many routes and paths of the labyrinth of technological development.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has been a celebration of the several types of imperfection. The technological 
problems involved in designing and manufacturing computer chips have given an insight in 
problems and issues in the knowledge economy at large. The imperfections have been suggested 
to enable rather than endanger technological progress.  
• The imperfection of the silicon (its pollution with ions of arsenic and 
gallium) gave it its semi-conducting character and thereby the possibility 
to embody logical gates. 
• The inaccurate rendering of physical reality as being digital allowed the 
application of Boolean logic and the design of immensely complex IC 
architectures and applications. 
• The interaction across the community of chip design and manufacturing 
based on familiarity rather than knowledge allowed the adding 
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knowledge to knowledge which produced a vast growth in technology 
and civilization.  
• The impasses of developing the close to perfect hearing instrument were 
overcome by accepting an incomplete representation of sound 
frequencies.  
• The strategy of technological development was portrayed as one of 
multiple detours, pursuing an indirect road towards the goal.  
In many ways, all these examples challenge the conventional ways to defining the managerial 
role in the knowledge economy. We claimed above that technology management is half 
instrumentation, half affordance. But we come to conclude that it is probably more affordance 
than instrumentation. It seems to avoid providing efficient inputs and precise guidelines. Rather 
it stimulates search, imagination and the exploration of the labyrinth, very often by erecting 
impasses, rather than removing them. We don’t know if that qualifies as good management, and 
if it doesn’t, then the efficiency of an imperfectly managed community of chip design and 
manufacturing should not surprise us. Still it requires some kind of explanation. That seems to be 
the current impasse for the further development of the theory of technology management.  
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